Abstract: Th e aim of the article is to present four models of "a minor disciplinary breach" in some normative acts of the Polish legal system. Th e author concludes that the interpretation of the concept of "a minor disciplinary breach" should derive from the concept of "a less serious crime" and include components of the term "social harmfulness of an act". Th e thesis is to prove that the interpretation of the concept of disciplinary minor off ences uses the interpretation of the concept of a less serious crime and includes the components of the term "social harm of the act". Th e legislator requires to impose this measure when it is unnecessary to apply stricter sanctions and disciplinary proceedings should not be initiated. In this case, the guilty party should be punished with the mildest disciplinary sanction and he or she may appeal against admonition. Th e conclusions propose solutions de lege ferenda relating to the interpretation of the term of "a minor disciplinary off ence" and explain problems associated with appealing against rulings rendered in disciplinary proceedings in the context of some rules of the criminal procedure.
Introduction
Legal procedure experts generally agree that a purpose of criminal proceedings is the requirement to hold a perpetrator criminally liable for a prohibited act he or she has committed. Disciplinary proceedings are generally treated in the literature as criminal proceedings sensu largo. For the above reason, referring to the object of disciplinary proceedings, it may be claimed that it is just the requirement to hold a person disciplinary liable for a disciplinary off ence he or she has committed. In many Acts envisaging disciplinary liability 1 , the Polish legislator most oft en only 1 Th ere is no comprehensive normative act regulating disciplinary proceedings in the Polish legal system, but this responsibility is provided for in several dozen acts and normative acts of a fundamental rank. It is estimated that the number of such acts is almost 70, and the ordinances generally regulates disciplinary provisions as they are, in principle, solely limited to a defi nition of a disciplinary off ence, specifi cation of a catalogue of disciplinary penalties and disciplinary authorities and rules of procedure. Other aspects of disciplinary liability are merely regulated by the reference to the appropriate application of the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure or, much more seldom, to the provisions of the Criminal Code. Specifi city of disciplinary law and scattered sources impede a formulation of categorical statements. Nevertheless, it appears that we may fi nd in disciplinary law the institutions whose sources and inspiration are solutions elaborated in substantive and procedural criminal law. Furthermore, similar to procedural provisions contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure (CCP) which envisage diff erent ways of criminal liability enforcement, the legislator provides disciplinary law with various ways of disciplinary liability to be borne by a perpetrator. One of them is a penalty imposed under a minor disciplinary breach. Even though this procedure applies to many disciplinary Acts, it is not a subject of profound analysis of the doctrine representatives. Considerations thereon appear only occasionally -to accompany the analysis of a regulation draft ed for concrete disciplinary proceedings by the authors of comments to a selected normative act without a specifi c connection being made to the system of disciplinary and criminal proceedings in the Polish law. Although this study should not be treated as a fully comprehensive work thereon, it still attempts to look at the problem from the perspective of both substantive and procedural disciplinary law 2 . Th e article will present the structure of a minor disciplinary off ence in selected normative acts. Th e author attempts to prove that due to conciseness of provisions on minor breaches, one should take advantage of the criminal law representatives' output or achievements while reconstructing the above notion. Moreover, a purpose of the study is to depict the legislator's inconsistency in regulating the proceedings at the moment of implementing the course of a minor disciplinary breach from the perspective of the principle of two-instance proceedings and the ban on worsening a legal status of the accused. Th e conclusions will propose de lege ferenda solution both within the scope of interpretation of the term "a minor disciplinary breach" and explain doubts concerning appealing against rulings rendered under this course. almost 60. See the enumeration in the work: P. Czarnecki, Postępowanie dyscyplinarne wobec osób wykonujących prawnicze zawody zaufania publicznego, Warszawa 2013, pp. 487-525. 2 See also P. Czarnecki, Model postępowania dyscyplinarnego w polskim systemie prawa, (in:) P. Czarnecki (ed.), Postępowanie karne a inne postępowania represyjne, Warszawa 2016, pp. 253-264.
Models of minor disciplinary breaches -a normative aspect
Despite the fact that sources of disciplinary liability are scattered to a large extent, it may be noticed that apart from disciplinary penalties imposed under an ordinary (principal) course, the Polish legislator introduced a possibility of sentencing to disciplinary penalties imposed under the so called simplifi ed course. Apparently, four basic models of disciplinary proceedings may be distinguished: fi rst instance, second instance, judicatory and disciplinary.
Th e fi rst model (fi rst instance) operating in uniformed services envisages the application of a minor disciplinary breach by a superior who, as a rule, does not initiate disciplinary proceedings but interviews the inferior. Th e content of the interview is recorded in the form of a note enclosed to the fi les. Th e punished person most oft en may not appeal under the provisions on disciplinary proceedings.
An example of such a regulation is Art. 132 par. 4b of the Act on the Police 3 , pursuant to which in case of a minor disciplinary off ence, the disciplinary superior may renounce from launching proceedings and carry out a disciplinary interview with a perpetrator of a disciplinary off ence recording its content in an offi cial note. Th is note is enclosed into the personal fi les for one year. Identical regulations bind Border Guard offi cials (Art. 134a of the Act on Border Guard) 4 , Prison Service offi cials (Art. 230 par. 6 of the Act on Prison Service 5 ) and Customs Service offi cials (Art. 168 par. 1-3 of the Act on Customs Service)
6 . In the last case, the offi cial note is destroyed aft er the lapse of six months from the day of a disciplinary interview; whilst upon the perpetrator's request the note can be destroyed even aft er the lapse of three months.
Th e doctrine rightly underlines that even though it is common for all above cases to subordinate the offi cials to the disciplinary superior's authority while individual disciplinary regulations vary only in minor details, or a catalogue of penalties, or courses of procedure in relevant Acts, "minor breaches" are still disciplinary torts within disciplinary liability 7 . T. Kuczyński, Odpowiedzialność funkcjonariuszy służb zmilitaryzowanych za przewinienia dyscyplinarne mniejszej wagi, "Zeszyty Naukowe Sądownictwa Administracyjnego" 2012, No. 6, p. 27. In the second instance model, a specifi ed one-man authority also imposes a penalty in case of a minor off ence aft er listening to the accused. However, it diff ers from the fi rst model in that one may appeal against admonition issued by this authority to the collegiate disciplinary body. In this case information about the penalty is also enclosed to the personal fi les of a perpetrator of a given disciplinary off ence. Th e above model has been adopted, among others, with reference to academic teachers because pursuant to Art. 141 par. 1-3 of the Act on Higher Education, Rector shall impose admonition for a minor breach aft er listening to a teacher. Rector may also admonish a teacher at his or her discretion. An academic teacher admonished by Rector may appeal to the University Disciplinary Committee for Academics. An appeal must be submitted within fourteen days from the day a notice of admonition was served while the Committee may not impose a stricter penalty
8
. Similar regulations bind university students and PhD students.
Pursuant to Art. 118 par. 1-2 of the Act on the State Fire Service, the disciplinary superior may impose a written admonition against a fi reman for a minor breach not justifying the launch of disciplinary proceedings but not later than before the lapse of three months from the moment he or she became aware of the off ence. Th e punished person may appeal against admonition imposed by the disciplinary superior to a competent disciplinary committee while the committee may not rule against him or her
9
. Th e second instance model is also applied to attorneys. Pursuant to Art. 85 par. 1-2 of the Act on the Advocacy
10
, if admonition is a suffi cient disciplinary measure to punish an attorney or attorney trainee without the need to impose a disciplinary penalty in the light of the circumstances or in case of a minor breach, Dean of District Bar Council may reduce penalty imposed on an attorney or attorney trainee to dean admonition upon Disciplinary Ombudsman's request. Disciplinary Ombudsman may also submit such a motion aft er the decision refusing to open disciplinary proceedings or discontinuing such proceedings has become fi nal. Dean may not impose punishment ex offi cio. Imposing dean admonition, Dean may concurrently oblige the attorney or attorney trainee to apologize to the injured party or to another appropriate conduct. Pursuant to Art. 85 par. 3 of the Act on the Advocacy in connection with Art. 48 of the above quoted Act, one may appeal against dean admonition to a competent disciplinary tribunal within seven days from the day on which the admonition was awarded. Almost analogical solution was envisaged in Art. 66 par. 1-3 of the Act on Legal Advisors
11
. Furthermore, Art. 53 par. 1-2 of the Act on Research Institutes stipulates that Director imposes admonition for minor disciplinary off ences aft er listening to a research worker or research technician while the employee may appeal to a disciplinary committee within fourteen days from the day on which a notice of punishment has been served whilst the committee may not impose a stricter penalty
12
. Th e same solution has been adopted in Art. 109 par. 1-3 of the Act on the Polish Academy of Sciences
13
. Nearly analogical solution has been applied in Art. 55a par. 1-2 of the Act on the General Counsel to the Treasury 14 . President of the General Counsel may issue a written caution for a minor disciplinary off ence not justifying the launch of disciplinary proceedings aft er listening to a legal advisor. A legal advisor may request the Employment Tribunal competent according to the main seat of the General Counsel to repeal the caution. One is not entitled to cassation against the second instance tribunal's decision. A certain modifi cation of this solution has been applied in Art. 97b of the Act on the Supreme Audit Offi ce
15
. Th e third model (judicatory) is to reduce discomfort experienced by the accused who committed a minor disciplinary off ence even though a collegiate authoritymost oft en a disciplinary committee -is then to decide about it.
Th is solution was applied to doctors because pursuant to Art. 82 par. 2, Medical Court may discontinue proceedings in case of a minor breach or if the penalty imposed by the ruling was apparently futile due to the type and seriousness of the penalty imposed by a valid judgment for the same act in other proceedings envisaged by the Acts in so far as the injured party's interest does not preclude this
16
. In this case, discontinuation of disciplinary proceedings due to "a minor breach" is analogical to the discontinuation of criminal proceedings because pursuant to Art. 414 § 1 of the CCP, the court is obliged to discontinue proceedings if it fi nds "the case to be trivial" (Art. 17 § 1 point 3 of the CCP). An interesting institution has been envisaged in Art. 109 § 5 of the Act on Common Courts Organization. It stipulates that a disciplinary tribunal may reduce penalty without restriction in case of a disciplinary off ence or a minor off ence
17 . An analogical solution has been envisaged with regard to proceedings against patent agents (Art. 62 par. 3 of the Act on Patent Agents) 18 and prosecutors (Art. 142 § 5 of the Act on Prosecutors)
19 . According to these regulations, reducing penalty without restriction, a disciplinary tribunal fi nds that a perpetrator committed a disciplinary off ence but imposing any disciplinary penalty from the binding catalogue of penalties is futile.
In the fourth model, the legislator does not formally qualify a minor breach as a disciplinary punishable tort but rather as a manifestation of disciplinary liability. Th erefore penalty in this model is not a disciplinary penalty but a sanction for a specifi ed trivial off ence. A measure of this response is admonition, i.e. the least painful measure in the system of disciplinary liability.
An example the above model are provisions concerning judicial probation offi cers. Pursuant to Art. 53 par. 1-2 of the Act on Judicial Probation Offi cers, President of the Regional Court imposes a disciplinary sanction in the form of admonition on a district probation offi cer and his or her deputy while President of the District Court -on other probation offi cers. A probation offi cer may appeal to Minister of Justice or President of the Regional Court, respectively, within three days from the day he or she was notifi ed about the above punishment. Penalty is imposed in a written form and enclosed to the fi les. A similar regulation binds civil servants (Art Th e above quoted Acts do not enumerate cases involving minor breaches; they have been merely presented here to indicate the models applied in the Polish legal system. Mutual similarities between these regulations trigger attempts at these provisions' unifi cation. Although the creation of at least one model of minor disciplinary off ences appears possible, it is not an easy task still requiring legislative initiative 
Criteria for determining minor off ences
Th e legislator has not answered the question which criteria qualify a case as a "minor breach" in any of the above presented normative acts. We should remember that disciplinary proceedings belong to the group of repressive proceedings whilst criminal liability in the meaning of Art. 42 par. 1 of the Polish Constitution is the notion embracing disciplinary liability 23 . Due to similarities between criminal law and disciplinary law, it is apparently worth invoking criminal law structures such as "a trivial case" (Art. 115 § 2 of the Criminal Code), or "a minor case" occurring in numerous provisions of the CC, or even the defi nition of a minor case included in Art. 53 § 8 of the Criminal Fiscal Code, to establish the meaning of a minor disciplinary off ence. Pursuant to Art. 115 § 2 of the CC, it should be noticed that "assessing triviality of an act, the court shall consider a type and character of infringed rights, the size of infl iction or threatened infl iction of harm, a manner and circumstances of the committed act, perpetrator's motifs, a type of violated principles of precaution and a degree of their violation". It is assumed that even though the catalogue of these circumstances is closed, triviality of cases is subject to gradation. Yet, the assessment itself cannot be limited to generalizations and it is necessary to indicate concrete criteria even though they should not be identifi ed with a set of circumstances included in sentencing 24 . On the other hand, a "minor" off ence in the meaning of the Criminal Code occurs when the case is «trivial» 25 due to "subjective and objective circumstances of a given factual state", or "subjective and objective circumstances of an act" 26 , or "subjective and objective features of an act with particular inclusion of these elements that are characteristic of a given off ence"
27 . Comparing the defi nition of "triviality" and "minor breach", it should be emphasized that the above mentioned gradation may be accomplished only on the basis of the features of a concrete off ence; all circumstances must not be provided in an abstract manner, i.e. separated from the circumstances of a given off ence being committed. Th ere are no reasons to diff erentiate this situation on the basis of disciplinary provisions other than strictly criminal provisions. What is more, it seems that a repressive function of disciplinary liability, and sometimes even a reference to apply provisions of the CC and CCP, allow to use the directives of sentencing under Art. 53 of the CC while assessing a minor breach. A large number of these criteria is identical with the criteria of Art. 115 § 2 of the CC. A minor off ence occurs when a specifi ed authority believes that admonition or disciplinary interview with a perpetrator shall be suffi cient discomfort and formalized proceedings do not have to be initiated.
It appears that a minor disciplinary off ence is "such a disciplinary off ence (disciplinary tort) which on account of subjective and objective circumstances in a concrete case is characterized by a relatively lower degree of violation of deontological rules, or provisions of law binding representatives of professions where disciplinary or professional liability has been distinguished in relation to a disciplinary off ence". Yet it should be assumed that a nature of an off ence is not aff ected by the circumstances external to the act (e.g. the perpetrator's previous criminal record or conduct aft er committing the act).
Sometimes along offi cial practicality of the doctrine or case law, determinants of a minor breach are attempted to be reconstructed. An example thereof may be the Supreme Court's judgment on judges, according to which "it involves situations where mitigating elements of a subjective and objective nature prevail, particularly if they are trivial for the maintenance of judicial service, whereas a degree of guilt is insignifi cant. Circumstances external to the act (…) do not aff ect qualifi cation of a disciplinary off ence as a minor breach. A degree of triviality impacts the alleged disciplinary off ence too"
28
. With regard to police offi cers, it has been pointed out that: "Disciplinary off ences which are incidental, objectively unintentional and do not result from the police offi cer's malice, as in the above case, may be qualifi ed as minor breaches; hence the Police authorities should treat them accordingly in relation to Białostockie Studia Prawnicze 2017 vol. 22 nr 1 the applicant's complaint" 29 . A minor off ence is a peculiar type of a warning for the perpetrator not to continue specifi c conduct because more painful measures may be enforced in the future. Furthermore, one of the recent rulings acknowledged that "treating a case as a minor breach settles the act's legal qualifi cation, which cannot be connected with or depend on the accused person's personality, his or her attitude, conduct before and aft er the committed act as well as other circumstances aff ecting sentencing but external to the act"
30
. It can be claimed that if a one-man authority (Rector, Superior or Dean) issues admonition, they also decide whether a given off ence is a minor breach or not. Such authorities are not formally bound by any provisions, i.e. their decisions are taken arbitrarily. However, it should be assumed that they should follow the above mentioned criteria including specifi city of a disciplinary off ence's description adopted for a given professional group. Th us a minor off ence shall be a point located on the axis between quite trivial off ences and aggravated off ences. However, if a one-man authority decides that the criteria are fulfi lled, then it is bound to apply provisions on a minor breach. Hence, even though its decisions are discretionary, they are by all means not random. Moreover, they shall most oft en be subject to control in the appeal.
Th e course of proceedings in case of a minor disciplinary off ence
It should be concluded from the above considerations that sanctions for a minor breach are imposed in special disciplinary proceedings. Th erefore it can be claimed that sentencing by a one-man authority for the above off ence is a disciplinary procedure. Two questions arise here: fi rstly, whether principles of ordinary (model) disciplinary proceedings should apply to such a procedure and, secondly, whether a ruling issued in the course of a minor breach may be appealed against.
Referring to the fi rst of the above issues, it should be acknowledged that even though relevant provisions are in so far concise, it seems that such rules will generally be binding, yet not fully. For instance, a person who shall be admonished will have to be heard fi rst; that is to say he or she has the right to defence and to counteract the accusation brought by a Disciplinary Ombudsman. Furthermore, he or she may be supported here by Defence Counsel as it is not forbidden by the law since admonition is most oft en issued aft er the closure of investigative proceedings. Th e authority imposing admonition is obliged to follow the principle of objectivism and assumed innocence. On the other hand, the issue of an appeal against the ruling issued under the course of a minor breach is much more complicated because disciplinary provisions scattered all along the Polish legal system envisage various solutions thereon. Generally, it may be recognized that the fi rst instance model does not envisage appeals. Yet it results from the fact that punishment under the course of a minor breach is not treated in this model as disciplinary proceedings but rather as a form of the corporate power or a requirement to subordinate to the superiors.
In the remaining three models, control in the form of an appeal has been envisaged. Yet it is generally a form of control within disciplinary proceedings. Th erefore disciplinary admonition may be appealed against to the court/tribunal (disciplinary committee) which, in principle, may not aggravate a disciplinary ruling. Finding the appeal justifi ed (reasonable), it may uphold a decision of the authority issuing a minor breach. If it fi nds this decision to be too hasty, it may acquit the person.
Nevertheless, another question arises here: may the ruling issued by a disciplinary committee in the case of admonition imposed by a one-man authority be appealed against? Th e legislator has not off ered one solution. It is most oft en not implied expressis verbis, or provided very rarely. For instance, in the regulations on attorneys (Art. 85 par. 4 of the Act on the Advocacy) or legal advisors (Art. 66 par. 4 of the Act on Legal Advisors), the legislator has straightforwardly indicated that "Disciplinary Tribunal's ruling on the appeal mentioned in par. 3 may not be challenged at all". Unfortunately, in most cases the legislator remains silent. For instance, it does not result from the content of Art. 140 of the Act on Higher Education if academic teachers are entitled to the appeal even though it is deemed admissible in practice 31 . It should be mentioned in a side note that this issue has been very divergently interpreted in the courts' case law with regard to fi remen. Nevertheless, it has been eventually assumed that rulings issued by the committee with regard to admonition may be appealed against to an administrative court
32
. How can this dilemma be resolved if the legislator remains silent?
On the other hand, it may be claimed that due to the constitutional right to a trial in disciplinary cases (the standard under Art. 42 par. 1 and Art. 45 par. 1 of the Polish Constitution apply to these cases), court control over minor breaches should be admitted even if admonition has been verifi ed by the collegiate authority. If admonition imposed for a minor disciplinary off ence and admonition issued under an ordinary course evoke the same eff ects, the same rules of appealing against these decisions should be binding. On the other hand, it may be argued that if a one-man authority may impose solely the most lenient penalty and sometimes be satisfi ed with listening to a perpetrator, control before a common court should be refused. It should be remembered that revising one-man authority's ruling, the appeal committee may not aggravate the penalty imposed by and thus worsen the accused person's legal status. Moreover, if an appeal against the ruling to a common court is admitted, the accused person will, in principle, have more instances (by one) to challenge the settlement than in the ordinary course of proceedings. Paradoxically, the accused is invalidly provided with an additional measure of appeal in a less serious case. For these reasons, the second opinion should rather be approved of.
Conclusion
In the light of the above considerations, the ensuing conclusions can be treated as a general summary of the discussed subject matter.
First of all, a minor disciplinary off ence is an institution embracing one of the alternative ways (courses) of disciplinary liability enforcement; yet in cases that are generally more trivial (less socially harmful). Th e provisions on minor off ences may be solely applied to conduct or behaviour satisfying features of a disciplinary off ence. It refers only to such minor off ences where a degree of violation of obligations or duties by a representative of a given profession is slight, or professional dignity of the practiced job has not been seriously breached. Although the above mentioned stipulations are evaluative and unspecifi ed, a disciplinary authority is obliged to consider whether given conduct is characterized by such a minor breach in the course of pursued proceedings.
Secondly, minor disciplinary off ences express the legislator's trust in disciplinary authorities which may qualify a given conduct as an example of such a minor breach in the context of the freedom of requested or imposed penalty. It should be strongly emphasized that even though disciplinary authorities are free to decide about the qualifi cation of a given conduct as a minor case, they do not enjoy full discretion in this respect. Th e legislator has clearly defi ned a degree of a disciplinary response to a given category of an act whilst disciplinary authorities should qualify minor disciplinary off ences on the basis of all subjective and objective circumstances of a given disciplinary off ence taking into account the directives of sentencing referring to them.
Th irdly, although not all disciplinary Acts contain a formulation of the appropriate application of provisions of the Criminal Code or Code of Criminal Procedure, remembering that disciplinary law derives from a wide stream of repressive law, interpreting the term of "a minor breach", it is worth relying on the achievement of criminal law science in the context of such institutions as social harm of an act, triviality of an act (slight social harm), directives of sentencing, or minor cases. Disciplinary law's discomfort interferes with civil rights by applying disciplinary sanctions; it is generically close to criminal law, or it even partly is its special branch. Nevertheless, specifi city of disciplinary law should be taken into account in each case even though the circumstances of the structures of typical criminal law institutions are generally identical.
Fourthly, analyzing the structure of a minor disciplinary off ence, we cannot forget about procedural consequences of this institution. Since the discussed notion is a manifestation of peculiarly interpreted opportunism and, additionally, it can be applied to such attitudes that are not characterized by a serious degree of social harm, the right to challenge decisions to a common court may be limited. Th e above mentioned inconsistencies within this scope should be resolved by the legislator who should determine the conditions of instances in the discussed context more accurately.
